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Reapportionment-Nine Years into the "Revolution" and
Still Struggling
Malapportioned legislative districts traditionally have inhibited
the effective working of government at the federal, state, and local
levels. By 1960, the population disparities among legislative districts
had attained such great magnitude "that the integrity of representative government was in many instances endangered."1 The underrepresented victims of malapportionment sought relief through the
courts. Initially the Supreme Court, ever hesitant to enter the "political thicket," declined to address itself to reapportionment controversies.2 This era of judicial inaction ended in 1962 with the Court's

I. McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 M1c11. L REY.
223, 226 (1968).
2. In Colegrove v. Green, 828 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946), the Court, speaking through
Justice Frankfurter, had declined to review malapportionment in congressional district•
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ruling in Baker v. Carr,8 in which the plaintiffs overcame the formidable barrier posed by the political-question doctrine. In Baker,
the Court granted individual voters standing to challenge antiquated electoral districts and thereby ignited the "reapportionment
revolution."4

I.

THE EVOLVING STANDARDS AND EFFECTS OF THE

REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION

A.

The Initial Cases

Shortly after resolving the standing question in Baker, the Court
began to lay the groundwork for a restructuring of the nation's representative bodies. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 6 the Court relied on
article I, section 2 of the Constitution6 to invalidate Georgia's congressional redistricting program. The state legislature was instructed
to redraw district lines so that as "nearly as is practicable one man's
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's."7
The severely malapportioned state legislatures were the next to
be constitutionally scrutinized. In Reynolds v. Sims, 8 the Court invoked the equal protection command of the fourteenth amendment
to require that states "make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of [their] legislature[s], as nearly of
equal population as is practicable." 9 Although the Court did not
spell out any precise constitutional tests, it did present some general
guidelines for legislative action. 10 "Mathematical exactness" in population among the districts was rejected as "hardly a workable constitutional requirement."11 Rather, the "overriding objective" of a
ing because it wo.uld be "hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in
the politics of the people."
3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION, REAPPORTIONil9·38 (1968).
4. 369 U.S. at 197-98, 208-37. The impact o[ the Baker decision cannot be overemphasized. In evaluating all oE his Court's rulings, former Chief Justice Warren con•
sidered it as the most important, its impact eclipsing even that oE Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). N.1'.. Times, July 6, 1968, at 42, col. I.
5. 376 U.S. I (1964).
6. "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States ••••"
7. 376 U.S. at 8.
8., 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
9. 377 U.S. at 577.
·10. The Justices were careful not to imply that Reynolds represented a judicial
usurpation of the legislative role in redistricting. They reiterated that "legislative
reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative considerntion and determination."
377 U.S. at 586. For a discussion of the problems posed by this preference for legislative
rcapyorti~nment, see Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1226, 1267 (1966).
11, 877 U.S. at 577.
MENT IN LAW AND POLITICS
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reapportionment scheme was to be "substantial [population] equality. "12 This standard, however, was not to be an end in itself. Substantial population equality was to be just the vehicle to achieve the
"basic aim of legislative apportionment"-that being "fair and effective representation for all citizens.''13
In one of the several reapportionment cases decided on the same
day as Reynolds, Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly,14 the Court
rejected the State's reapportionment program even though the electorate had approved it as a constitutional amendment. The decision
elaborated somewhat on the "as nearly as practicable" standard. The
plan established districts for the lower house of the legislature with
a maximum population-variance ratio between the most and least
populous districts of 1.7 to 1.15 The Court reserved the question
whether this size deviation by itself violated constitutional requisites.
The upper-house apportionment, which "clearly involve[d] departures from population-based representation too extreme to be constitutionally permissible"16 (a population-variance ratio of 3.6 to I),
was sufficient to invalidate the entire proposal. Thus Lucas presented
to the lower courts the further necessity of evaluating an apportionment scheme "in its totality" to determine whether the necessary
"good faith effort to establish districts substantially equal in population has been made.'' 17
B.

The Extension of the Reynolds Doctrine
into Local Government

Although Reynolds limited its scope to "both houses of a state
legislature,"18 lower courts soon applied its principles to local governments possessed of legislative power.19 These courts reasoned that
12. 377 U.S. at 579.
13. 377 U.S. at 565-66.
14. 377 U.S. 713 (1964). In addition to Reynolds and Lucas, the following cases
were decided on the same day with full opinions: WMCA, Inc. v. Lomcnzo, 377 U.S.
633 (1964) (New York); Maryland Commn. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S.
656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S.
695 (1964) (Delaware). Vann v. Baggett and McConnell v. Baggett, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(Alabama), were decided as companion cases to Reynolds.
15. 377 U.S. at 727.
16. 377 U.S. at 728.
17. 377 U.S. at 735 n.27.
18. 377 U.S. at 577.
19 See, e.g., Davis v. Dusch, 361 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1966), revd., 387 U.S. 112 (1967)
(Virginia Beach City Council); Ellis v. Mayor &: City Council, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir.
1965) (Baltimore City Council); Brouwer v. Bronkema, 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98
(1966) (Kent County Board of Supervisors); State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d
43, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965) (every Wisconsin County Board of Supervisors except those
of Milwaukee and Menominee Counties); Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209
N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965) (Common Council of Binghamton). See also R,
DIXON, supra note 3, at 544.
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the delegation of such power by a state to its political subdivisions
(counties, municipalities, and towns) was sufficient state action to
impose the obligations of the fourteenth amendment, and the standards of Reynolds, on the apportionment of their governing bodies.20
On the basis of such decisions, an action was instituted in 1965
against the governing body of Rockland County, New York, by a
citizen of the county. Lodico v. Board of Supervisors21 attacked the
constitutionality of the structure of the county Board of Supervisors,
which consisted of five members each of whom simultaneously
served as the executive of one of the county's five towns (Orangeto'wn, Ramapo, Haverstraw, Clarkstown, and Stony Point). 22 Under
this system of local government, a supervisor's election to the post
of town executive automatically made him its representative to the
county body. Thus the county's legislative districts were established,
not on the basis of population, but according to town boundaries. 23
The Lodico court recognized the population disparity among the
towns24 and ordered the formulation of a reapportionment plan.25
The Board, acting on the suggestion of a previously established reapportionment commission,26 presented a plan to the county's voters
in November of 1966. It was rejected by the electorate.27 This proposal, popularly known as Plan B, preserved town boundaries as
20. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 59-60, 132 N.W.2d
249, 257 (1965); Brouwer v. Bronkema, No. 1885 (Cir. Ct. Kent County, Mich., Sept. II,
1964), affd. by an equally divided court, 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98 (1966), discttSsed
in Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment on Counties and Other
Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 21, 27 (1965).
21. 256 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The action had been initially instituted in a
state court, but the defendants removed to a federal district court. Lodico v. Board
of Supervisors, 256 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
22. Rockland County's "towns" could also be referred to as townships. However,
since the state custom is to refer to such bodies as towns, that designation will be
used herein.
23. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, THIS IS ROCKLAND COUNTY 5 (2d rev. ed. 1963), on
file with the Michigan Law Review. At about the same time, other similarly apportioned New York county governments, authorized by N.Y. CouNTY LAw art 4, § 150
(McKinney 1950), were also challenged in federal and state courts. See, e.g., Bianchi
v. Griffing, 238 F. Supp. 997 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 15 (1965), reinstituted,
256 F. Supp. 617 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) (involving Suffolk County); Augostini v. Lasky, 46
Misc. 1058, 262 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1965).
24. 256 F. Supp. at 444. The two criteria used by the court to evaluate the extent of
the malapportionment were the ratio of population between the largest and the smallest
towns and the percentage of the total population that could elect a majority of the
Board. Orangetown's population of 43,172 was 4.9 times greater than Stony Point's
8,739. In addition, 58,567 out of a total of 136,803 county residents, or 43% of the
population, controlled a majority of the seats on the Board. 256 F. Supp. at 444.
25. 256 F. Supp. at 450. The court also gave the defendants the alternative of preparing a charter embodying provisions for the election of a legislative body for the
county on a reapportioned basis. 256 F. Supp. at 450.
26. The reapportionment commission had been established by the Board of Supervisors in July of 1965. 256 F. Supp. at 445.
27. The Journal News (Nyack, N.Y.), Nov. 9, 1966, at 1, col. 3.
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district lines by having each legislator elected at large from his own
town. To comply with the "one man-one vote" 28 principle, representatives were distributed among the towns on a population basis. This
plan would have created multimember districts with Ramapo, the
tmvn with the greatest population, receiving five seats, Orangetown
and Clarkstown four seats, Haverstraw two seats, and Stony Point
just one seat. The tradition that a supervisor serve simultaneously as
both a town chieftain and its representative in the county legislature
was to be continued.29 After the November election, Plan B and
other schemes3° were reconsidered by the commission. One alternative proposed a legislature of seventeen members elected from singlemember districts. This program, in contrast to Plan B, was not fixed
to existing town boundaries. Commonly referred to as Plan S, the
proposal also prohibited the supervisors from serving in their dual
capacity. However, in a special election of April 1967, the electorate
turned down both Plan Sand the resubmitted Plan B. 81
Later in that year, a new commission reproposed Plan S's singlemember districting scheme to the Board.32 By September 1968, the
supervisors' lack of response to this proposition prompted another
citizen of the county to seek a judicial order directing the recalcitrant Board of Supervisors either to reapportion itself or to hold a
referendum on this most recent proposal by the commission.83 The
Board's response was to submit a weighted voting plan to the state
supreme court (trial division). On May 12, 1969, the court declared
this proposal unconstitutional and directed the Board to submit another plan "with all deliberate speed."84
Shortly thereafter, the Board, again bypassing Plan S, presented
the court with a multimember districting scheme similar to the twice
previously rejected Plan B.35 The only distinction between this
28. This expression had become the popular slogan for Reynolds' concept of substantial population equality or the "as nearly as is practicable" doctrine. IL~ judicial
origin is Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963):
"The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can
mean only one thing-one person, one vote."
29. I.EACUE OF '\VOMEN VOTERS OF THE TOWNS OF CLARKSTOWN, ORANGETOWN AND
RAMAPO, 1966 VOTERS GUIDE (information pamphlet), on file with the Michigan Law
Review; Brief for Petitioners June Molof et al. at 6, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182
(1971).
30. Additional plans discussed at a February 1967 public hearing were a weighted
voting scheme and a county-at-large proposal. Brief for Petitioners June Molof et al.
at 6, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
31. The Journal News, April 14, 1967, at 1, col. 4.
32. Brief for Petitioners June Molof et al. at 6, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971),
33. Abate v. Mundt, 59 Misc. 2d 809, 300 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct, Rockland County
1969).
34. 59 Misc. 2d at 814, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 453,
35. Brief for Petitioners June Molof et al. at 8, Abate v.,Mundt, 403 U.S._182 (1971),
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revised Plan E and its unsuccessful predecessors was that its apportionment of the legislative seats was based on the latest (1969)
census. The revision (Plan B) created an enlarged legislature of
eighteen members chosen from five legislative districts, which again
corresponded to the town borders. The provision for the automatic
seating of each town's supervisor on the county board was retained.
Assignment of legislators among the towns was determined by their
populations' relation to that of Stony Point's 12,114 residents. The
number of seats granted the other districts were determined by
dividing each town's population by this unit of 12,114. Fractional
results were rounded off to the nearest integer. This process produced a population variation of 11.9% between the most overrepresented and underrepresented districts.so This time the state court
upheld the constitutionality of the plan.s7 The decision, however,
excluded the provision granting the town supervisors ex officio seats
in the legislature. They could now continue to serve in both capacities only 1if they won an election for each position. Thus the protracted political and judicial struggle initiated by the Lodico decision began its journey through New York's appellate courts en route
to the United States Supreme Court as Abate v. Mundt.ss
C.

The Supreme Court's Elucidation
of the Reynolds Standard

During the five years between the district court's Lodico decision
and the subsequent ruling in Abate, the Supreme Court refined
Reynolds' "as nearly as practicable" standard of population equality.
In its 1967 decision of Swann v. Adams,s9 the Court examined
Florida's attempt to adhere to Reynolds' commands. The defendant's post-Reynolds reapportioned legislature had a maximum pop36. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 184 (1971). The ideal population per legislator
is calculated by dividing the total population (218,804) by the total number of representatives (18). A town's deviation from equality is then obtained by comparing its
population per legislator to the ideal of 12,156. Thus Stony Point is overrepresented
by 0,3%, Haverstraw by 2.5%, and Clarkstown by 4,8%, while Ramapo is underrepresented by 0.2% and Orangetown by 7.1%. These deviations are based on the
1969 population figures:
Stony Point
12,114
Haverstraw
23,676
Orangetown
52,080
Clarkstown
57,883
Ramapo
73,051
These figu~es appear in 403 U.S. at 184 n.1.
37. Abate v. Mundt (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term ~ockland County, July 21, 1969) (unreported), affd., 33 App. Div. 2d 660, 305 N.Y.S.2d 102 (2d Dept.), affd., 25 N.Y.2d 309,
253 N.E.2d 189, 305 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1969), afjd., 403 U.S. 182 (1971). The unreported
opinion ~s. reprinted in Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at. 12-29, Abate v. Mundt, 403
U.S. 182 (1971).
.
.
·. ·.
.
·
·38. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
89. 885 U.S. 440 (1967).
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ulation-variance ratio among its senate districts of 1.30 to I (a total
deviation of 25.65%). The disparity in the house was even greater.40
Florida unsuccessfully contended that its plan, which was drawn to
conform with existing congressional district lines, came "as close as
'practical' to complete population equality."41 However, to the
Court, it was "quite obvious" that the State could have created legislative districts of more equal population.42 One indicium of the defendant's lack of good faith in redrawing the district lines was its
rejection of the plaintiff's alternative proposals, which would have
measurably reduced many of the population disparities among the
districts. 43
Swann's invalidation of Florida's 25.65% disparity partially clarified the arithmetic component of the "as nearly as practicable" standard of population equality established by Reynolds. However,
even this enunciation of a more exacting test did not produce a
definitive resolution of the doctrine's mathematical contours.44 In
addition, Swann left unresolved several other questions of import.
Although the Court indicated that it would tolerate unavoidable de
minimis deviations, 45 it failed to proffer any maximum percentage
variance that would so qualify. Seemingly, the Court would also
permit deviations of even Swann's magnitude if justified by "a satisfactory explanation grounded on acceptable state policy."40 The
Court, however, declined to describe any such "satisfactory explanation."
Swann, which involved a state legislature, also left unclear the
question whether its strictures were to be extended to congressional
and local redistricting. At least in the latter instance, an answer
appeared to be shortly forthcoming. Late in 1966, the Court entertained appeals from four local government reapportionment cases.
However, by dismissing on technical jurisdictional grounds the two
· appeals directly concerned with Reynolds' applicability to countywide governing bodies,47 the Court avoided a resolution of this
40. 385 U.S. at 442-43. The house figures were a population-variance ratio of 1.41
to I, with a total deviation of 33.55%.
41. 385 U.S. at 445.
42. 385 U.S. at 445.
43. 385 U.S. at 445.
44. Swann's tightening of Reynolds is best observed by the fact that the rejection
of the Florida plan implied invalidation of the post-Reynolds judically approved plans
in nearly half the states. For a discussion of the Court's elucidation of mathematical
contours, see R. DIXON, supra note 3, at 445.
45. 385 U.S. at 444.
46. 385 U.S. at 444.
47. Moody v. Flowers, 887 U.S. 97 (1967), dismissing appeals from Moody v.
Flowers, 256 1'". Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966), and Bianchi v. Griffing, 256 F. Supp. 617
(E.D.N.Y. 1966) (see note 23 supra). Both cases had been originally tried by three•
judge panels convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). Direct review was rejected by
the Supreme Court because these cases involved "local" law rather than a law of
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problem. The Justices did cautiously venture into the local government area by deciding the other two cases on their merits. This
excursion was purposely limited as the exact question "whether the
apportionment of municipal or county legislative agencies is governed by Reynolds" was specifically reserved.48
In the first of these cases, Sailors v. Board of Education,49 the
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Kent County, Michigan, school board. The board was not chosen directly by the electorate but rather by representatives of the local school boards, who
were popularly elected in their home districts. Since each local
board, regardless of the size of its constituency, sent only one delegate to the biennial meeting that selected the county body, the petitioners alleged that the "one man-one vote" principle was being
violated. The Court finessed the question of Reynolds' applicability
by holding its principles inapposite since the county school board's
membership was basically appointive rather than elective and since
the board performed essentially administrative rather than legislative
functions. 50
In the second case, Dusch v. Davis,51 the Court -evaluated the
constitutionality of the government of the City of Virginia Beach,
Virginia. This recently consolidated body was the result of the merging of the governments of the city and the adjoining Princess Anne
County. Four of the new legislature's eleven members were elected
at large without regard to their residence. The other seven were
similarly elected at large. However, each of these seven was required
to reside in a different borough of the new city-thereby entitling
each of the seven political subdivisions to a resident representative. 52
Thus, even when it assumed the applicability of "one man-one vote"
to the new government, the Court upheld its constitutionality. The
majority reasoned that the city-wide election process made each representative "the city's, not the borough's, councilman." 53 Absent
state-wide application and should have been initiated before a single judge. Also, an
intermediate review by a federal court of appeals was necessary prior to any final
disposition by the Supreme Court. 387 U.S. at 103-04.
48. Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 114 (1967), revg. 361 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1966).
49. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
50. 387 U.S. at 109-10. The population disparity among the local school districts
was astronomical. The City of Grand Rapids delegate represented 201,777 people. The
four smallest school districts' populations ranged from 99 to 145. R. D1xoN, supra
note 3, at 547.
51. 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
52. 387 U.S. at 114.
53. 387 U.S. at 115. The Court's reasoning followed closely its allowance of residence
requirements for the election of state· senators from a multidistrict county in Fortson
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). Therein the Court stated that since a senator's "tenure
depends upon the county-wide electorate he must be vigilant to serve the interests of
all the people in the county, and not merely those of people in his home district; thus
in fact he is the county's and not merely the district's senator." 379 U.S. at 438.
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this unique aspect of the scheme, the Reynolds principle would have
required the invalidation of the program since the boroughs' populations ranged from 733 to 29,048. 54 However, these figures were
extraneous to the Court's decision since each legislator necessarily
represented an equal number of people (the city's entire population), and "one man-one vote" was therefore satisfied.
After having skillfully avoided the question of the applicability
of Reynolds to local governments during its 1967 term, the Court
abandoned its prior hesitancy by reviewing Avery v. Midland
County, 55 a Texas decision that had struck down a malapportioned
local government. In affirming the invalidation of the selection process of the Commissioners Court of Midland County, the Supreme
Court adopted the reasoning of those lower courts that had previously deemed "one man-one vote" applicable at the local leve1.ao
Thus, in Avery, Justice White said that "[t]he Equal Protection
Clause reaches the exercise of state power however manifested,
whether exercised directly or through subdivisions of the State."a7
The majority refused to limit their ruling to local governments that
are strictly "legislative."58 They recognized that the functions of the
Commissioners Court, like those of most local governing bodies,
cannot be easily "classified in the neat categories favored by civics
texts." 59 The tasks assigned these governmental units represent a
conglomeration of classical legislative, executive, administrative, and
judicial services. Rather than distinguish among these bodies on
such an artificial basis, the Avery Court held Reynolds applicable to
any "unit with general governmental powers over an entire geographic area." 00 Governments encompassed by Avery could "not be
apportioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal
population." 61 In enunciating this standard, the Supreme Court
specifically rejected the Texas supreme court's contention that the
"number of qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county
roads and taxable values"62 were proper factors to be considered in
the reapportionment process. At the same time, Avery was not intended, as the Court's reaffirmance of Sailors and Dusch indicates,
to be a roadblock "in the path of innovation, experiment, and development among units of local government." 63
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

387 U.S. at 117 n.5.
390 U.S. 474 (1968).
See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
390 U.S. at 479.
390 U.S. at 482.
390 U.s. at 482.
390 U.S. at 485-86.
390 U.S. at 486.
390 U.S. at 478.
390 U.S. at 485. The dissents of Justices Harlan and Fortas highlight some
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After the extension in Avery ·of- the "as nearly as practicable"
principle, the Court went on to elucidate its meaning. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 64 the first of two 1969 opinions on congressional
redistricting, the Court rejected defendant Missouri's contention
that the 5.97% population deviation existing among its congressional
seats was small enough to be considered de minimis and thereby
automatically satisfy the constitutional command. The Court again
refused to establish any fixed numerical standard that might encourage legislators to settle for particular percentage deviations and
sacrifice the concept of constructing legislative districts "as nearly
as practicable" equal in population. 65 Rather than adopt any per se
rule, the Court reiterated that every deviation would be scrutinized
with "regard to the circumstances of each particular case.'' 66 The
circumstances of Kirkpatrick negated Missouri's assertion of the
requisite good-faith effort to achieve population equality. First, the
Missouri legislature relied on inaccurate census data to apportion
the seats. Even using such data, map-makers could have better approximated numerical equality by simply transferring political subdivisions of known population between contiguous districts. In
addition, an alternative plan, which would have markedly reduced
the population disparities, was rejected by the legislators without
consideration. 67 In short, to the Kirkpatrick Court, it seemed, as it
had to the Swann majority, " 'quite obvious that the State could
have come much closer to providing districts of equal population.' " 68
Simultaneously with Kirkpatrick, the Court struck down New
York's districting legislation in the case of Wells v. Rockefeller. 69
The New York scheme treated certain sections of the State as "homogeneous" regions and divided them into congressional districts of
reasons for the Court's prior hesitancy to delve directly into the local government
area. Justice Harlan, noting the administrative problems and judicial burdens imposed
by the application of "one man-one vote" to the fifty state legislatures, questioned the
logic of extending it to some 80,000 units of local government. 390 U.S. at 489-90.
Justice Fortas paid great attention to the "complexities of local government." 390 U.S.
at 499. Fortas argued that many local governments, and certainly the Midland County's
Commissioners Court, because of their often limited and specialized functions and
powers, do not vest in all their voters the same rights and interests. He felt the equal
protection requirement to be relevant only if the substance of the citizens' rights and
interests are equal. Therefore Fortas concluded that Reynolds should be applied only
to those governing units having an "essentially equal impact upon all the citizens
within its geographical jurisdiction" and not to local governments per se. 390 U.S. at
500 n.5.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

394 U.S. 526 (1969).
394 U.S. at 531.
394 U.S. at 530.
394 U.S. at 532. See Recent Development, 15 V1LL. L. REv. 223, 228-33 (1969).
394 U.S. at 532, quoting Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 445 (1967).
394 U.S. 542 (1969).
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virtually identical populations. Thirty-one seats were apportioned
in accord with this regional principle; another ten districts were
composed of groupings of whole counties. This approach produced
a total population deviation of 13.l %,70 The Court found the State's
interest in keeping intact those "regions with distinct interests" an
inadequate justification for so large a population disparity. 71 The
Court also invalidated the legislation because of New York's misplaced priorities in apportioning its congressional seats:
The general command, of course, is to equalize population in
all the districts of the State and is not satisfied by equalizing popu•
lation only within defined sub-states. New York could not and does
not claim that the legislature made a good-/aith effort to achieve
precise mathematical equality among its 41 congressional districts. 72

Thus, the 1969 Kirkpatrick and Wells decisions represent the
Supreme Court's most recent attempts to guide legislative map•
makers in achieving the Reynolds goal of fair and effective represen•
tation. The basic measurement of the acceptability of apportionment
plans had been established as the "as nearly as practicable" criterion, which was most commonly expressed in terms of a percentage
deviation or a mathematical ratio. By the time the petitioners in
Abate were granted certiorari in February 1970,73 the preceding
reapportionment cases had developed the standard that "only the
limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a goodfaith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is
shown" 74 are allowable under the Constitution.
In order to use this standard to evaluate the constitutionality of
Plan B's 11.9% population deviation in Abate, the Supreme Court
70. 394 U.S. at 549. The maximum deviation above the ideal population was 6.488%,
and that below was 6.608%, Therefore, the total deviation was 13.1 %·
71. 394 U.S. at 546.
72. 394 U.S. at 546 (emphasis added).
73. 397 U.S. 904 (1970). Petitioners June Molof et al., members of the League of
Women Voters, had been granted leave to intervene as party plaintiffs on April 16,
1969. Brief for Petitioners June Molof et al. at 7, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971),
On July 9, 1969, the day immediately following the Board's presentation of Plan B
to the Rockland County court, Cornelius T. O'Sullivan, Ichabod F. Scott, and Michael
J. Clarke, residents of underrepresented Orangetown (see note 36 supra) were also
permitted to intervene as party plaintiffs. Id. at 8. Also during 1970, the Court ex•
tended the Avery doctrine to make Reynolds applicable to the election of trustees
to a junior college school district. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
74. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969). In Kirkpatrick, Missouri unsuccessfully offered as justification for the existing population disparities among its
congressional districts the following items: "[R]epresentation of distinct interest groups,
the integrity of county lines, the compactness of districts, the population trends
within the State, the high proportion of military personnel, college students, and
other nonvoters in some districts, and the political realities of 'legislative interplay.'"
394 U.S. at 530. The Court, in an action reminiscent of its handling of Swann (see
text accompanying note 46 supra), suggested that justifications for population dis•
parities do exist but did not elaborate on what they might be.
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had to scrutinize carefully the state interests offered to justify the
deviation. 75 The defendant Board of Supervisors attempted to justify
the disparity on grounds of a great need for "intergovernmental
coordination" at the local level and the ability of this plan to satisfy
that necessity by fostering "extensive functional interrelationships"
between the county and its component towns. 76 The Court, however,
was hesitant to accept this aspect of Plan B by itself as sufficient justification for the deviation. Therefore, it was significant to the A bate
majority that "Rockland County has long recognized the advantages
of having the same individuals occupy the governing positions of
both the county and its towns." 77 The Court emphasized Plan B's
ability to facilitate membership by the town supervisors on the
county board through the plan's preservation of an "exact correspondence between each town and one of the county legislative districts. "78 On the basis of the "long tradition of overlapping function
and dual personnel in Rockland County government,"79 the Court
found the 11.9% population deviation among the constituencies of
the Rockland County Legislature to be constitutionally acceptable.80
II.

THE .AFTERMATH OF ABATE
IN ROCKLAND COUNTY

The stated purpose of the "reapportionment revolution" was to
achieve "fair and effective representation for all citizens." 81 Prior to
the Supreme Court's final determination of Abate, neither the fairness nor the effectiveness of the Rockland County government had
been noticeably improved by the various reapportionment proposals.
It is not altogether clear that the Court's decision in Abate has contributed to the attainment of this goal.

A. Stability of the Rockland
County Legislature
The long and tumultuous process of commission reports, public
referenda, and time-consuming and expensive litigation suggests that
75. 403 U.S. at 185-87. Although the Court apparently used the most recent reapportionment standard set out in Kirkpatrick and Wells, Justice Marshall's majority
opinion cites neither case. Perhaps the conspicuous absence of Kirkpatrick and Wells
can be explained by the Court's reaction to the criticisms leveled at the two opinions.
See authorities cited in note 90 infra.
76. 403 U.S. at 186.
77. 403 U.S. at 186.
78. 403 U.S. at 187.
79. 403 U.S. at 187.
80. The Rockland County Legislature, created by Plan B, had replaced the Board
of Supervisors as the county's governing body in January 1970. The Journal News,
June 8, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
81. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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the "reapportionment revolution" was not producing better government for the people of Rockland County. During the interval between Lodico and the inauguration of the new legislators in January
1970, the county was governed by a judicially invalidated body.
However, the lack of finality of the lower court decisions precluded
even the new government from operating at full efficiency. The
legislators, although elected for a four-year term, worked constantly
under the threat of a new court-ordered election. This lack of certainty about their position inhibited the legislators' potential to
provide meaningful government. An apparent prerequisite to better
representation was an end to the litigation and the creation of a governing body with a solid foundation.
The importance of this need for governmental stability to the
Court's decision to legitimize the new legislative body is unclear.
Whether or not motivated by a concern for stability, the A bate decision did create Rockland County's first judicially sanctioned government in over five years. One immediate impact of the approval of
Plan B was to overcome the uncertainty about the future of the
legislature previously felt by its members and the public.82 However,
despite this initial gain, Abate's long-range effect may well be the
perpetuation of the instability that had previously been detrimental
to the legislature's operations. Although the Abate majority was willing to accept, in the circumstances of this case, a population deviation of 11.9%, it indicated that any larger disparity would be
suspect: "[N]othing we say today . . . could justify substantially
greater deviations from population equality." 83
Serious questions about the government's future validity exist
because deviations of greater than 11.9% are almost an inherent
feature of the scheme. Chief Judge Fuld dissented from the decision
in the New York Court of Appeals because of the potential for
gross inequality in representation under Plan B:
[I]f the population of each of the towns happens to approximate an
integral multiple of that of Stony Point-as it does under the 1969
census-then, the deviation will be relatively small-for example,
as in this case, 12%, More typically, however, the formula will require a rounding off of large fractions and will result, accordingly,
in very much greater deviation.84
82. The Journal News, June 8, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
B"3. 403 U.S. at 187.
84. 25 N.Y.2d at 322 n.2, 253 N.E.2d at 196 n.2, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 474 n,2 (emphasis
original). Judge Fuld further elaborated:
The potential for inequality inherent in the plan becomes even more apparent
when one considers that an increase of only 3,000 in the population of Stony
Point, assuming that the populations of the other towns remain constant, would
change the deviation from the present 12% to approximately 47%, In fact, it is
theoretically possible for a plan such as the one before us to result in deviations
approaching 100%. And, since the plan rigidly fixes district lines-providing for
no variation-there is no way to compensate' for or minimize such extreme
deviations.
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Obviously the deviation in any apportionment scheme will vary as
the census figures change. If the disparity grows too great, reapportionment will be necessary. The distinguishing feature, therefore, of
Plan B is the unique problem it creates when reapportionment is
necessary. The typical government's adjustment process to malapportionment is at least theoretically simple. Within the existing governmental structure, district lines can be redrawn to reduce the population disparities. In Rockland County, this corrective technique is
not feasible. The core of Plan B is the correspondence of legislative
districts and town boundaries. Any shifting of district lines would
disrupt this desired relationship. Therefore, the traditional adjustment procedure is not possible within the existing legislative framework of Rockland County. Reapportionment can only be accomplished by a complete restructuring of the government.
Plan B's future deviations will be limited to 11.9% only if all
the towns grow at the same rate. The census data indicate that this
occurrence is unlikely. Between 1960 and 1970, the differentials in
the towns' growth rates ranged from Orangetown's 24.0% to Ramapo's 118.7%.85 The county planning board projects a similar speytrum of unequal population gains for the 1970-1985 period. 86 Today
the foundation of the Rockland County Legislature is perhaps as
shaky as it ever was. The inevitable population changes will subject
it to constitutional attack each time "deviations greater than 11.9%
occur. These challenges need not be successful to frustrate the workings of the government. The mere existence of pending litigation
and its inherent threat of drastic governmental structural change (as
experienced prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Abate) will
suffice to impede the practical effectiveness of the legislature. Therefore, to the extent that the Supreme Court attempted to promote
fair and effective representation by providing for a more stable government, its achievement is at best illusory.

B. Multimember Districting and
Fair and Effective Representation
Absolute mathematical equality between legislative districts is
not necessarily synonymous with better government. Political scientist William M. Beaney maintains that, given the realities of the
legislative process, attempts to achieve precise equality will not produce any better result than will substantial equality-i.e., 5-10 per
25 N.Y.2d at 322, 253 N.E.2d at 196, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 474. The Supreme Court recog•
nized the contention that "the Rockland County plan may produce substantially
greater deviations than presently exist," but reserved its opinion for the future. Its
deference, however, almost extends an open invitation to future litigants: "Such questions can be answered if and when it becomes necessary to do so." 403 U.S. at 186 n.3.
85.
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cent deviation.s 7 In fact, depending on the structure of the legislative
map, an unnecessarily strict adherence to the "one man-one vote"
principle may impede effective representation. The Illinois 1964 at
large election for its lower house is, of course, the classic example
of meaningful representation being frustrated by an insistence on
mathematical perfection.ss In addition, there is some belief that an
absolute-equality standard facilitates the task of any "gerrymanderminded" map-maker.so
From its decision in Baker through Kirkpatrick and Wells, the
Court had promulgated successively stricter standards for reapportioning legislative bodies. This apparent progression toward a demand for an absolute-equality standard is open to severe criticism.00
Judicial evaluations of legislative apportionments must involve more
than just "simplistic formula[e] based on numbers alone." 01 Abate
therefore presented the Court with an opportunity to re-emphasize
Reynolds' admonition that "one man-one vote" is merely the means
to achieve the desired end of fair and effective representation. Unfortunately, the Abate majority's approval of Plan B's multimember
districts92 relegates this ultimate goal to a lower position than even
the severest critics of the Kirkpatrick and Wells decisions had ever
imagined.
The dynamics of multimember districts, such as those introduced
into Rockland County, are inherently inimical to the goal of fair
representation. Professor Josephine King contends that their use
raises "important problems in democratic government." 93 Professor
Robert Dixon strongly criticizes any remedy that includes at large
87. Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote",
1969 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 219, 232.
88. See R. D1xoN, supra note 3, at 302-03. In actuality, this at large election was

not the result of the "one man-one vote" movement, Rather, it resulted from the
equal-population district mandate of a 1954 amendment to the Illinois Constitution.
Id.
89. This point was strongly debated in Kirkpatrick and Wells. The Kir!,patrick
majority, citing A. HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING 59 (1964 rev. ed.), noted that
a requirement of equal-population districts severely inhibits the political cartographer's
freedom to gerrymander. 394 U.S. at 534 &: n.4. Justice Harlan, dissenting in both
cases, felt quite strongly that the opposite is true: "[T]he rule of absolute equality
. is perfectly compatible with 'gerrymandering' of the worst sort," 394 U.S. at 551.
90. E.g., Dixon, supra note 87, at 219-43; Dixon &: McKay, Election Districts: Substantial Population Equality, and Exceeded Expectations, I HUMAN RIGHTS 74 (1970);
Hill, The Reapportionment Decisions: A Return to Dogma1, 31 J. PoL. 186 (1969);
Recent Case, 35 Mo. L R.Ev. 246, 250-51 (1970).
91. Dixon &: McKay, supra note 90, at 80.
92. Plan B is a typical multimember legislative scheme. Four of the five districts
are represented by more than one legislatot. Each official, whether his area's sole
representative or just one of several, is elected at large in the district, See notes 28 &:
35-36 supra and accompanying text.
93. King, The Reynolds Standard and Local Reapportionment, 15 BUFFALO L. R.Ev,
120, 123 (1965).
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elections, which are the very basis of any multimember scheme: "An
election at large ... is not a remedy in the sense of being an alternative and better representation system. From the standpoint of representation, it creates more problems than it solves."94 In multimeniber districts, the voter is faced with a longer and more confusing
ballot.9l'i The candidate, facing an enlarged electorate, has greater
campaign demands placed upon his time and money. As a result, the
voter is often less familiar with each individual office seeker. This
process de-emphasizes both the candidate's personality and his involvement in local affairs and forces the less knowledgeable and
somewhat confused voter to rely more heavily upon the candidate's
party affiliation. Furthermore, slight majorities within multimember
districts often elect legislators that may not adequately represent
significant but not predominant social, economic, geographic, or
racial interests within the district. 96
In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 97 a case decided concurrently with
Abate, the Court recognized several unfavorable aspects of Indiana's
multimember districting system for its state legislature,98 but was
not willing, on the facts of the case, to declare multimember districts "inherently invidious and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment."99 However, the refusal of the Whitcomb majority to strike
down multimember districting schemes per se did not automatically
preclude the Abate court from invalidating Plan B. In Whitcomb,
the Supreme Court was willing to permit Indiana's continued use of
multimember districts but sustained the district court's order to
redistrict the state, an order which was in part designed to correct a
population disparity of 24.78% among the existing house districts. 100
Therefore, Whitcomb's allowance of multimember districts was
limited to a legislative structure in which population deviations
among the districts are adjustable by means of the normal redistrict94. Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional
Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REv. 209, 228 (1964).
95. The Supreme Court recognized this troublesome aspect of multimember districting in the Lucas case. 377 U.S. at 731.
96. King, supra note 93, at 123.
97. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
98. We are not insensitive to the objections long voiced to multi-member district

plans. • • • Criticism is rooted in their winner-take-all aspects, their tendency to
submerge minorities and to overrepresent the winning party as compared with the
party's statewide electoral position, a general preference for legislatures reflecting
community interests as closely as possible and disenchantment with political parties and elections as devices to settle policy differences between contending interests.
The chance of winning or significantly influencing intraparty fights and issueoriented elections has seemed to some inadequate protection to minorities, political, racial, or economic; rather, their voice, it is said, should also be heard in thu
legislative forum where public policy is finally fashioned.
403 U.S. at 157-59.
99. 403 U.S. at 160.
100. 403 U.S. at 161-63;
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.ing process. Plan B's unique .structural aspect effectively negates the
possibility of correcting such deviations in Rockland County by the
conventional method. Rather, its insistence on the preservation of
town boundaries and utilization of them as the boundaries of the
multimember legislative districts locks the population disparities
into the very structure of the government.101
The A bate court disposed of the petitioners' challenge to Plan
B's multimember scheme in a single footnote. 102 The lack of appreciation of this crucial aspect of the reapportionment scheme belies the
Court's devotion to its espoused goal of achieving fair and effective
.representation. This analytical shortcoming, discomforting when observed within the context of a developing constitutional doctrine, is
even more so when one realizes its actual impact on Rockland
County government.103

III.

THE COURTS ANALYTICAL FAILURES

IN .ABATE

The Abate decision resulted in part from the Court's failure to
apply an established reapportionment criterion and to comprehend
the underlying political basis of Plan B. In its opinion, the Court
improperly ignored the map-makers' lack of good faith, while it
wrongly emphasized their political preference.

A.

The Neglected Good-Faith Requirement

Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Abate defended Rockland
County's 11.9% population variance with the statement from Reynolds that" '[m]athematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable
constitutional requirement.' " 104 In £act, Reynolds and its progeny
101. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
102. 403 U.S. at 184 n.2. The Abate Court considered multimember districting
relevant only if the plaintiffs could show that the districting scheme by itself "oper•
ate[s] to impair the voting strength of particular racial or political elements," 403 U.S.
at 184 n.2.
The Court's quick disposal of this multimember district issue becomes even more
shocking when it is compared to Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971), decided just
four days prior to Abate. In Connor, a three-judge district court had reluctantly per•
mitted Mississippi to establish a multimember legislative district in Hinds County.
The lower court voiced a strong preference to have the county's scats apportioned
among single-member districts. However, in light of the lack of the time available before the statutory deadline for filing notices of candidacy, the court felt it impossible
to properly construct single-member districts and therefore countenanced the Hinds
County multimembcr district for the 1971 election. However, the Court, despite a vigo•
rous dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black and Harlan (402 U.S. at 693),
noted that single-member districts arc a preferable judicial remedy for reapportion•
ment and extended Mississippi's filing date for candidates so that the district court
would have sufficient time to "devise and put into effect a single-member district plan
for Hinds County." 402 U.S. at 692.
103. See note 159 infra.
104. 403 U.S. at 185, quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
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command only that legislative districts be of "as nearly of equal population as is practicable."105 The cases do dictate, though, that the
state "make an honest and good faith effort"106 to comply with this
constitutional standard. Several features of Plan B's implementation
suggest that the Board of Supervisors could have come much closer
than they did to providing districts of equal population. Yet Justice
Marshall's opinion is conspicuously devoid of any mention of the
good-faith obligation. Only the dissenting Justices Brennan and
Douglas inquired into this aspect of the equal protection mandate.107
Among the indicia of the Board's noncompliance with the goodfaith requirement, perhaps the most prominent is the Supervisors'
persistent refusal to consider an alternative proposal that would have
substantially reduced the population disparity. It was the Board's
failure to act on the 1967 commission's reproposal of Plan S that
prompted Abate to initiate his suit in late 1968. Plan S, revised to
account for the latest census data (as was Plan B when it was finally
adopted in 1969), would have produced a population variation of
only 3.5% by utilizing eighteen single-member districts.108 The existence of an alternative plan, yielding a lower disparity ratio, has
been a strong indication that legislators have not fulfilled their goodfaith obligations in redistricting. For instance, in Swann, the plaintiffs had proposed an alternative scheme; the Court, although
recognizing the possible imperfections in the proposal, regarded its
existence as a significant factor in evaluating the defendant's program.
The very suggestion of an alternative demonstrated that closer approximations to the mandated norm were at least feasible. 109 Likewise, in Kirkpatrick, the Missouri General Assembly's rejection of a
reapportionment plan that established districts with only slight population variances was one of the factors the Court considered in evaluating the defendants' compliance with the good-faith requirement.11°
Abate must stand in sharp contrast to its predecessors since the updated Plan S apparently did not warrant the Abate majority's consideration.
Had the Court inquired into the possible reasons for the Board's
rejection of this and other alternative plans, another possible infer105. 377 U.S. at 577.
106. 377 U.S. at 577.
107. Justices Brennan and Douglas relied on Wells and would have reversed:
The plan here allegedly represents as close to mathematical exactness as is possible without changing existing political boundaries or using weighted or fractional votes. But a plan devised under these constraints is not devised in the
good-faith effort that the Constitution requires. In Wells v. Rockefeller .•• we
struck down a similar plan.
403 U.S. at 187, 188.
108. Brief for Petitioners Cornelius T. O'Sullivan et al. at 19, Abate v. Mundt, 403
U.S. 182 (1971).
109. 385 U.S. at 445-46.
110. 394 U.S. at 529, 531-32.
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ence about the defendants' lack of good faith might have emerged.
An analysis of the history of the county's reapportionment suggests
that the Board's selection of Plan B-supposedly made to preserve the
traditional interrelationship between the towns and county government-may have been primarily dictated by the legislators' own
self-interests.111 First, an incumbent town supervisor running for a
seat on the county body has an inherent advantage since his constituency for both posts is exactly the same and his name (as supervisor) will already be well known to the same people who vote for
him as a county legislator. The possibility that self-preservation was
an overriding motive is further suggested by the Board of Supervisors' initial proposal, which would have permitted their appointment to the county legislature ex officio. The Board's successive
appeals of the trial court's exclusion of that provision emphasizes
their desire to maintain dual roles. 112 An analysis of the extent to
which this selfishness tainted any attempt to create equal-population
districts should have played an integral part in the Court's evaluation
of the plan in its totality. Previously, other courts have considered
evidence of illicit motives when appraising the constitutionality of
reapportionment schemes. In League of Nebraska Municipalities v.
Marsh,11 3 a congressional-districting proposal, apparently written
with a view toward keeping incumbent representatives in office, was
rejected for violating the Reynolds requirements.114 An alternative
Jll. The selection of Plan B by the reapportionment commission as its recom•
mendation to the Board also hints at improper activity by the defendants. Initially,
the commission had approved a Plan S-type, eighteen-man legislature with singlemember districts. At the last minute, the group reverted to the multimember districting plan. In protest, an opposition report was filed. One of the dissenters blamed
the "pressure" brought upon some of his fellow commissioners as the reason for the
sudden switch. The Journal News, June 18, 1969, at 17, col. I.
112. See Brief for Petitioner Samuel J. Abate, at 12, 14, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S.
182 (1971).
113. 242 F. Supp. 357 (D. Neb. 1965), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 1021 (1966),
114. 242 F. Supp. at 360-61. The emphasis that a judicial evaluation of legislative
acts should place on the representatives' motivations is a controversial issue. Marsh's
evaluation of the map-makers' motives was criticized because "traditional constitutional
analysis would require that if deviations can be explained by rational and 'legitimate'
considerations, then a plan should be constitutional regardless of a selfish interest of
the legislators." Note, supra note IO, at 1248. Indeed, the Court has often explicitly
stated that motivation is irrelevant to constitutional questions. See, e.g., United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114-16 (1941); Sozinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14
(1937). However, Professor John Hart Ely contends that these "rejections" of constitutional motivational challenges are just dicta. He states that the Court will summarily dismiss this argument "only in situations where the law under attack can be
defended in constitutionally legitimate terms." Ely, Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1222 (1970). Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963),
introduced a line of cases that support Ely's belief that legislative motivation is an
issue in constitutional adjudication. Schempp's contribution was the "purpose or elfect"
test used to determine the validity of a statute affecting religious freedom: "[T]o with•
stand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 874 U.S. at
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proposal that would have diminished the disparities between districts·
was unacceptable to the map-makers as it would have retired four or
five of the incumbents. The court soundly rejected this "justification": "The goal of reapportionment ... is just representation of the
people, not the protection of the incumbents in a legislative body." 1115
The Supreme Court, while never ruling directly on the question, has
indicated a strong disapproval of this self-preservation motive. In
Dusch, the Court indicated that it would not accept "an evasive
scheme to avoid the consequences of reapportionment or to perpetuate certain persons in office." 116
A Supreme Court invalidation of Plan B based on the Supervisors'
absence of good faith would not have constituted a radical departure from existing reapportionment standards. However, the A bate
Court's refusal to consider the Board's possible lack of good faith can
only reinforce the criticism that the essence of reapportionment doctrine is little more than a "simplistic formula based on numbers
alone." 117
B.

The Unwise and Unnecessary Choice

The Board of Supervisors' selection of Plan B affected the distribution of political and governmental power in Rockland County. Its
preservation of town boundaries retained most of this power within
the individual tmvns. The alternative Plan S, with its single-member
districts not inherently aligned with the towns, would permit each
legislator to look beyond the borders of his own town and thereby
would create a more "county" legislature. 118
In determining the constitutionality of Plan B, the Court need
222. Justice White, dissenting in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 240 (1971), con•
curs with Professor Ely's analysis. He attacks the "majority's assertion that it is impermissible to impeach the othenvise valid act of closing municipal swimming pools
by resort to evidence of invidious purpose or motive." 403 U.S. at 241. White cites
Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), as standing "for the proposition that
the reasons underlying certain official acts are highly relevant in assessing the consti•
tutional validity of those acts." 403 U.S. at 264. White also considers legislative motive
an integral part of the judicial evaluation of a reapportionment scheme. "'But there
is no suggestion here that Marion County's multi-member district, or similar districts
throughout the State, were conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further ra•
cial or economic discrimination.' " 403 U.S. at 242-43, quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 149 (1970) (emphasis added by Justice White).
115. 242 F. Supp. at 360.
116. 387 U.S. at 116 (emphasis added).
117. Dixon & McKay, supra note 90, at 80.
118. Michael H. Prendergast, former State Democratic Chairman and a Rockland
County resident, ·opposed Plan B because of its retention of the Supervisors' "township
empires." He vigorously endorsed Plan S because of its strong central government. He
considered its dominant advantage to be the ability of each of its legislators to think
in terms of benefiting the entire county and not just his particular town. The Record
(Bergen County, N.J., Rockland County, N.Y. ed.), Oct. 20, 1966, § C, at 1, col. I.
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not have considered the relative merits of either of these political
orientations. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Baker, had explicitly
warned against choosing between "competing theories of political
philosophy."119 Unfortunately, by basing their decision on "the long
tradition of overlapping function and dual personnel in Rockland
County government," 120 the majority, perhaps unknowingly, entered
the "political thicket." Had they not thought it so important to
continue "to encourage town supervisors to serve on the county
board,"121 the Justices probably would not have sanctioned the exact
correspondence between each town and one of the county legislative
districts that produced the 11.9% population disparity among Plan
B's multimember districts. The Abate Court did more than just approve a legislative preference for a government of town rather than
county orientation; it permitted this choice to serve as the constitutional justification for an otherwise impermissible percentage deviation.
What was so compelling about encouraging town supervisors to
serve on the coun,ty board that the Court was willing to accept an
almost 12% deviation? It seems that the Court was persuaded by the
respondents' strenuous urging that "the county's rapidly expanding
population ha[d] amplified the need for town and county coordination . . . .''122 In view of the greatly increased demand for county
services, this point is undebatable. The Board, however, argued that
the continuation of a direct voice in the performance of county
government for the towns was an absolute prerequisite to such cooperation.123 However, the necessity for an institutional interrelationship as the catalytic agent for this desired cooperation is unclear.
Having the same individual serve simultaneously at both levels
119. ll69 U.S. at ll00.
120. 403 U.S. at 187.
121. 403 U.S. at 187. This "encouragement" for town supervisors to serve on the
county legislative body by the Abate majority is rather interesting. The desirability
of having town officials serve simultaneously as county legislators has been seriously
questioned: It has been argued that their dual positions build serious conflicts of
interest into the system. The supervisor on the county board is just one of several
legislator-executives, while in his town he is the chief executive officer. This position
in the town offers the supervisor the most power and therefore he will often find it
the more attractive of his positions. Such a supervisor is content, therefore, to keep
the county ineffective and impotent to challenge the towns. Conflicts will arise between what the supervisor conceives to be the needs of his town's residents and those
of the county as a whole. One obvious solution to this problem is to cut apart the
supervisors' two functions. Weinstein, supra note 20, at 29 n.35. Weinstein has suggested that doing so might "produce a more rational-a!}d less costly-system of local
government." Id.
122. 403 U.S. at 183.
123. The county's attorney argued that this cooperation had existed under the
prior government only because "the elected executive served on the County Board of
Supervisors." Brief for Respondents at 10, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971). Since
the town supervisors no longer serve ex officio on the county board (see text following
note 37 supra), this alleged advantage of Plan B may be illusory.
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arguably would provide readily accessible channels of communication
between the governments. Yet no other advantages are immediately
apparent. Certainly there is evidence of cooperation between governments even in the absence of the structural relationship deemed essential by the Board of Supervisors. Within Rockland County itself
the villages and special districts cooperate with both the towns and
the county,124 yet neither are represented directly on any other governing body. On the national level, cities and counties are not directly
represented as units in Congress, yet federal programs and grants
play an integral role in their rendering of services.
Even if this "town voice" concept is vital, it is unclear why only
Plan B's multimember districts, tied as they are to the town boundaries, can preserve it. The alternative proposal-Plan S-creates districts that cross town boundaries in only three of eighteen instances.
Since the constituencies of the other :fifteen representatives are all
residents of one or another of the county's five towns,125 it appears
that any unique town interest would be heard in the county government. In addition, with district lines dra-wn as contemplated in Plan
S, each town would have at least one representative whose electorate
would reside wholly within the town. Therefore, each such subunit
of the county would have at least one voice in the legislature whose
strength need not be compromised by attempts to appeal to voters in
the other towns. Consequently, even assuming the necessity for
perpetuating a town voice, the defendants' argument that Plan B's
equation of town boundaries and county legislative districts is the
only means of doing so is unconvincing. The Abate Court, by elevating this dubious contention into a constitutional justification for an
11.9% population deviation, compounded its initial error of considering the relative advantages of either a town- or county-based
legislature in determining Plan B's constitutionality.
IV.

THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ABATE

Justice Brennan, dissenting in Abate, stated that the decision
could "have little or no precedential value" for future reapportionment cases because "no other local apportionment scheme can possibly present the same combination of factors relied on by the
Court." 126 This belief, however, gives too little credit to the ingenuity
of advocates working in this field. Some of the loose wording reflecting the analytical weaknesses of the Abate opinion will undoubtedly
be cited in future reapportionment controversies. This, of course,
presents the danger that justifications /nit~ally intended to be limited
124. See generally LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 23, at 27-42.·
125. Brief for Petitioners· Cornelius T. O'Sullivan et al. at 19-28, Abate v. Mundt,
403 U.S. 182 (1971).
126. 403 U.S. at 189.
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to the particular conditions of Rockland County may be seized upon
by any government to legitimize othenvise impermissible deviations
from the dictates of Reynolds.
A.

The Variable "As Nearly As Is Practicable" Standard

The New York Court of Appeals decision presented the Supreme
Court with a questionable justification for tolerating Abate's 11.9%
deviation. In rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that Plan B's "minor" population variance rendered it defective, the New York court
assumed that different tests should apply to reapportionment cases at
the national, state, and local levels. These districting schemes, the
court felt, should be evaluated with variable standards regarding the
permissible variations from strict equality and the justification for
these deviations. The New York court's analysis of Supreme Court
reapportionment cases indicated to it that three distinct tests exist:
[I]n regard to apportionment of congressional districts, the permissible variation from strict equality is indeed almost micrometic
and the justification required for such deviation is correspondingly
stringent. Decisions dealing ·with apportionment of State Legislatures
tend to reflect a broader scope for permissible deviations and a more
tolerant attitude toward the practical justifications for deviations.
Similarly, and of particular relevance on this appeal, the Court has
indicated a willingness to allow a still broader scope for permissible
deviations from strict population equality and the justifications for
such deviations when dealing with local, intrastate legislative
bodies.121

This variable "as nearly as practicable" standard is pragmatically and
analytically suspect.
One important practical aspect of Rockland County's government
ignored by the New York Court of Appeals was the fact that the new
legislature is unicameral. In the Lucas case, the Supreme Court suggested that governments with bicameral legislatures might be permitted slightly greater deviations from strict population equality if
the overrepresentation of a particular area in one chamber was offset
by a corresponding underrepresentation of the same area in the other
house.128 Naturally a unicameral structure negates the possibility of
such offsetting discrepancies. For this reason, stricter standards for
apportioning unicameral legislative bodies have been proposed120
127, 24 N.Y.2d at 315, 253 N.E.2d at 191-92, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69.
128. 377 U.S. at 735 n.27. The deviations in each house may not always compcn•
sate for each other. The Court in the same footnote added that "disparities from
population-based representation, though minor, may be cumulative instead of offsetting
where the same areas are disadvantaged in both houses of a state legislature, and may
therefore render the app9rtionment scheme at ~east constitutionally suspect."
129. McKay, Reapportionment and Local Government, 36 GEO. WASH, L. REv. 713,
728 (1968); Weinstein, supra note 20, at 25.
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and indeed seem appropriate (assuming that there are no exceptional
factors involved).13°Congress, although structurally bicameral, should
be treated as unicameral for reapportionment purposes since deviations among House seats cannot possibly be balanced by adjusting
the constitutionally fixed Senate districts (the states). In fact, the
variable-standard concept enunciated by the New Yark court incorporates this idea by demanding the strictest application of "one
man-one vote" at the congressional level. However, by allowing the
most permissive standard for the reapportionment of Rockland
County, the court overlooked the significance of the fact that its government is unicameral, as are the overwhelming majority of local
governments.131 The New York court's per se toleration of greater
deviations by local governments is therefore contrary to the apparent
practicalities of reapportionment-at least in regard to unicameral
legislatures.
An additional deficiency in the opinion of the New York Court
of Appeals is its interpretation of the Supreme Court's reapportionment cases. Contrary to the New York court's holding that three
"one man-one vote" doctrines exist, other courts, in construing these
same cases, have concluded that the Supreme Court has promulgated
just one "as nearly as practicable" standard for reapportionment.
The position of these courts is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court has cited congressional districting precedents and state
legislative apportionment precedents interchangeably on all questions, including that of the population-equality standard.132 This fact
was of particular significance to the California supreme court in Calderon v. City of Los Angeles,133 a case involving the reapportionment
of the Los Angeles City Council, which was decided just prior to
Abate's final adjudication. The California court suggested that "it has
never been apparent that the [Supreme] Court .•. [has] produc[ed]
different yardsticks for districting matters." 134 Similarly, in Skolnick v.
Mayor and City Council of Chicago,135 decided during the interval between the lower court decision and the Supreme Court's ultimate rul130. For a discussion of some possible exceptional factors, see note 142 infra.
131. Weinstein, supra note 20, at 25.
132. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531-33 (1969). See also Dixon,
supra note 87, at 222 & n.16.
133. 4 Cal. 3d 251, 481 P .2d 489, 93 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1971). The California court
first explored the possible distinctions between federal and state reapportionment
standards. It considered the different constitutional bases for these "one man-one vote"
commands but rejected the theory of a variable test for compliance. The court did not
even consider the possibility that a unique standard is applicable to local governments.
Local bodies, like their state counterparts, were felt to be subject to the same fourteenth amendment standard. 4 Cal. 3d at 267, 481 P.2d at 499-500, 93 Cal. Rptr. ~t
371-72.
134. 4 Cal. 3d at 267, 481 P.2d at 500, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
135. 319 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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ing in A bate, a federal district court specifically rejected the New York
court's reasoning. Speaking for that court, Chief Judge William J.
Campbell refused to entertain the theory that "greater deviations are
permissible in state and local redistricting."136 Rather, he applied the
Kirkpatrick and Wells standard137 to the case, which involved the
redistricting of Chicago's municipal government.
Justice Marshall's statement in Abate that "slightly greater percentage deviations may be tolerable for local apportionment
schemes"138 does not directly sanction the New York court's variable
standard. However, the Court's affirmance of the lower court holding
and its failure to reject explicitly the logic thereof invites lawyers to
argue for, and lower courts to accept the existence of, such a standard.139 However, upon close examination, the language of the Abate
majority suggests that the Court permitted Rockland County greater
leeway in reapportioning, not because of any absolute rule for distinguishing among local, state, or congressional redistricting schemes,
but rather because of certain obstacles to achieving mathematical
equality among districts, which most often characterize local governments. In appraising Plan B, the Court noted two such considerations: "[L]ocal legislative bodies frequently have fewer representatives
than do their state and national counterparts and ... some local legislative districts may have a much smaller population than do congressional and state legislative districts . . . ." 140 This evaluation
recognizes the practical difficulties of adjusting a small population
disparity among Rockland County legislative districts. Any attempt
to achieve absolute population equality might entail drawing district
lines between houses in a residential neighborhood or even between
floors in an apartment building since small percentage deviations
136. 319 F. Supp. at 1222.
137. 319 F. Supp. at 1223. Judge Campbell never considered a separate, more permissive test for local governments. He also envisioned the differing constitutional bases
for state and congressional reapportionment commands as the only possible reason for
distinguishing their "one man-one vote" standards.
138. 403 U.S. at 185.
139. Already lower courts, although not yet directly basing their decisions on this
point, have indicated that Abate establishes a reapportionment standard for local
governments different from that existing on the state or federal level. In Wold v.
Anderson, 327 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mont. 1971), a case involving the reapportionment
of Montana's legislature, the district court read Abate to say that " 'slightly greater
percentage deviations may be tolerable for local government apportionment sd1emes'
than for 'state and national counterparts.' " 327 F. Supp. at 1344. Compare this interpretation with the actual Abate wording in '403 U.S. at 185. Sims v. Amos, •10
U.S.L.W. 2435 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 3, 1972), offers more evidence of the possible acceptance
by lower courts of the New York court's variable standard. Citing Abate as authority,
the •court stated: "[I]n the context of local apportionment, preservation of political
subdivisions cannot justify a deviation of substantially more than 11.9 per cent; where
state apportionment sdtemes are at issue less leeway is to be afforded." 40 U.S.L.W. at
2436.

140. 403 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added).
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among limited populations will actually involve very few people.
The defendants had presented this "practical difficulties". distinction
to the Court:
[I]t is one thing to draw district lines to pick up 4,093 people
[representing a 1% population deviation in a New York congressional district] and another to shift lines to include only 121 people
[representing a I% population deviation in a Rockland County
legislative district].141
This interpretation rejects the New York court's application of a
more permissive Reynolds standard to all local governments. Rather,
in evaluating reapportionment schemes, courts should consider the
absolute population size of the redrawn legislative districts along
with any peculiarities142 that might rebut the presumption that fair
and effective representation is best achieved by creating legislative
districts of equal population. For example, assume that the local
governing bodies of both Los Angeles County, California, and
141. Brief for Respondents at 21, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971). Respondents
elaborated on this point:
One apartment house in Rockland County may contain several hundred people.
Are we to start drawing lines through and around buildings? • • • It is patently
unworkable to expect that a map should be drawn without regard to the town
boundary, to carve out several apartment houses or several blocks of single family
residences for the purpose of excluding 859 people from the district to account for
a 7.1 % variance.
Id. Justice White had originally raised these points in his Kirkpatrick-Wells dissent:
"Ultimately, the courts may be asked to decide whether some families in an apartment
house should vote in one district and some in another, if that would come closer to
equality." 394 U.S. at 556. See also 394 U.S. at 538 (Fortas, J., concurring). However,
respondents' and Justice White's concern for the sanctity of apartment buildings may
have to be re-evaluated in light of the increasing sizes of these residential complexes.
Co-op City in the Bronx, at present the world's largest cooperative housing development, will eventually house 15,000 families. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1971: at 29, col. 8.
Assuming the likelihood of other similar complexes being built in the future, strict
adherence to the White logic would make districting in such areas rather difficult,
as units of 50,000 and more people could not be split up.
142. Justice Marshall's opinion hinted at one possible peculiarity. The fact that
local governments frequently have fewer representatives than their state or national
counterparts was used to help justify Abate's toleration of the 11.9% deviation. See
text accompanying note 140 supra. This is not always the case. In the less populous
states, the membership of the local governments, even if composed of only, four or
five persons, will occasionally be greater in number than the state's congressional
delegation. The greater flexibility thus available in reapportioning such local bodies
supports the argument that they should be held to a stricter mathematical requirement
than their state government in apportioning the House seats. Another possible factor
to consider is the dominant residential pattern of the area governed by the reapportioning legislature. A 6% population deviation among congressional districts of roughly
400,000 people in New York City may be more excusable than the same size disparity
among Montana's districts, even though the absolute number of people involved may
be similar. The redrawing of district lines to transfer 25,000 people among urban
districts may indeed necessitate the objectionable drawing of lines between floors in
a single building. However, in the rural area dominated by single-dwelling units, the
reallocation of 25,000 people does not produce the similar danger that district lines
will have to make arbitrary boundary distinctions between residents of the same
building.
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Hamilton County, New York, are being challenged for violations of
the "one man-one vote" rule. Assume also that each county's apportionment of its ten-man legislature deviates from the ideal by 10%,
Although the same standard should be applied, the factor of population size may produce a different result. The population of Hamilton
County is just 4,714,143 while Los Angeles County boasts a population
of more than seven million residents. 144 Although both cases involve
local governments, the 10% deviation affects 700,000 people in Los
Angeles. Unless sufficient reason is shown why the district lines could
not be redrawn to correct the disparity of approximately 70,000 people among the districts without detracting from the goal of fair and
effective representation, the California legislative scheme should be
invalidated. However, the same percentage deviation would involve
fewer than 500 Hamilton County residents. Redrawing district lines
in order to pick up only fifty people might be an enormously difficult
task. Therefore, if the other elements of the county's districting
scheme fulfill the good-faith and other Reynolds requirements, it
should pass constitutional muster.
This flexible approach to determining permissible percentage
variations from the population ideal is easily incorporated within a
single "as nearly as is practicable" standard. Courts should consider
the practical ramifications of demanding precise mathematical equality. The extent to which a court's rulings might coerce map-makers
into drawing objectionable district lines, which could impair the
government's ability to provide fair and effective representation,
should be an indication of whether the redrawn districts are "as
nearly as is practicable" equal in population. The alternative New
York variable-standard approach, besides resolving complex legal
issues by simple arbitrary rules, does not enhance the probability of
achieving better government.

B. Sailors, Dusch, Abate, and Local Government Flexibility
In approving Plan B's 11.9% deviation, the Abate Court relied
heavily on one facet of Sailors, reaffirming its proposition that "viable
local governments may need considerable flexibility in municipal
143. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, Nur.rnER OF INHABITANTS
NEW YORK 31 (1971) (vol. 34).
144. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, NUMBER OF INHABITANTS
CAI.1FORNIA 28 (1971) (vol. 6). Los Angeles County's 1970 population of 7,032,075 is
even more remarkable as it exceeds that of 42 states. Thus the county government
could be held to a stricter standard of "one man-one vote" than numerous state
legislatures.
Such disparities in county population sizes are common. In I!l62, the average county
population was 52,135. However, 37% of the total population resided in just 65 coun•
ties, or 2.1 % of all the counties. Meanwhile, the smallest 2!l4 counties, or 9.3%, embraced just 0,5% of the American populace. G. BLAIR, AMERICAN LoCAL GOVERNMENT
48 (1964).
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arrangements if they are to meet changing societal needs." 145 Sailors'
applicability here is questionable since its language praising local
government flexibility, regardless of its appeal, is dictum. Sailors did
not permit a greater deviation from "one man-one vote" than had
other cases because of any innovative aspect of the Kent County
school board. As previously noted, the board consisted of appointed
officials who performed predominantly administrative tasks. 146 The
Sailors Court exempted this body from the "one man-one vote" restraint and therefore never even considered how strictly Reynolds
should be applied to similar local governments.
The actual Sailors holding that appointed administrative bodies
need not adhere to Reynolds is inapposite to Abate. Reynolds' applicability to Rockland County's apportionment scheme was never at
issue in Abate. The Avery doctrine, that units "with general governmental powers over an entire geographic area" must comply with
Reynolds, 141 unquestionably encompasses the Rockland County Legislature. The functions of the new government are essentially to
approve policies, oversee county operations, and adopt the county's
budget. The latter task was emphasized in the Avery Court's evaluation of the impact of the Commissioners Court on the citizens of
Midland County: "In adopting the budget the court makes both
long-term judgments about the way Midland County should develop
-whether industry should be solicited, roads improved, recreation
facilities built, and land set aside for schools-and immediate choices
among competing needs." 148 The Rockland County Legislature is
involved in making similar priority determinations when formulating
the county budget. Moreover, in contrast to the appointed officials
in Sailors, the legislators are directly elected by the citizens of Rockland County.
It was the Dusch case,149 rather than Sailors, that suggested a more
flexible standard for local governments because of their particular
need for experimentation, innovation, and flexibility. In an effort to
resolve "complex problems of the modern megalopolis in relation
to the city, the suburbs, and the rural countryside," 150 the City of
Virginia Beach and the neighboring Princess Anne County merged
their governments. Many problems had prolonged the attainment of
this desired combination. The major difficulty was devising a system
145. 403 U.S. at 185, dting 387 U.S. at 110-11. The passage referred to is Sailors'
often-quoted recognition that "[v)iable local governments may need many innovations,
numerous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions. We see nothing in the Constitution to
prevent experimentation."
146. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
147. 390 U.S. at 485-86.
148. 390 U.S. at 483.
149. See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.
150. 387 U.S. at 117.
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of representation- that would satisfy both the "one man-one vote"·
principle and an apprehensive electorate.161 A proposal catering to
the exact command of Reynolds probably would have met defeat in
the popular referendum.152 Therefore, in order to appeal to the
voters, the controversial borough-residency requirement for seven
representatives was inserted. This so-called Seven-Four Plan, although ratified by the electorate, was subjected to constitutional
challenge. Finding no invidious discrimination, the Court upheld the
Plan153-a holding that seems to recognize, especially in regard to
innovations in regional and metropolitan governments, the need for
:flexibility and experimentation to develop responsive forms of representation at the local level.'
An innovative governmental structure, crucial to the decision in
Dusch, is totally absent in Abate. The Rockland County Legislature
is not the end product of a consolidation with, or incorporation of,
neighboring areas. Rather it is the same governing scheme that existed before, the sole difference being that the prior severe malapportionment has been "substantially" remedied. There is nothing
innovative or experimental about the existing structure of the Rockland County government. The concept of the town-based local government, perpetuated by Plan B, originated in New York with the
Duke of York's laws after the English conquest of New Netherlands
in 1664.154 The New York Colonial Assembly, on June 19, 1703,
passed a statute creating the essential elements of town-county government.155 Abate thus rewarded preservation, not innovation, since
to a large extent the decision was based on the long tradition of "overlapping function and dual personnel" in Rockland County government.156
The Supreme Court's permissive attitude toward Dusch's new
governmental structure should not have influenced its decision in
Abate.157 Yet the Court tolerated a large percentage deviation based
151. See R. DIXON, supra note 3, at 549-50; Sentell, Reapportionment and Local
Government, 1 GA. L. REv. 596, 604-05 (1967).
152. R. DIXON, supra note 3, at 549-50. During DtlSch's oral argument, Justice
'White asked counsel for the consolidated government whether strict application of
"one man-one vote" to the new government would have defeated the consolidation pro•
posal. Counsel answered in the affirmative. Id.
153. 387 U.S. at 117.
154. See H • .ALDERFER, AMERICAN LoCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 63 (1955).
155. Act of June 19, 1703, ch. 133, 1 N.Y. COLONIAL LAws 1664-1775, at 539 (1894).
This Act established a county board of supervisors comprised of one supervisor from
each town in the county. See G. BLAIR, supra note 144, at 34.
156. 403 U.S. at 187.
157. This analysis perhaps explains Justice Marshall's curious exclusion of Dusch
from his opinion. There is another major distinction between Dusch and Abate. The
Virginia Beach representatives were all elected at large over the entire area. The
Court therefore concluded that "one man-one vote" was satisfied as each legislator
necessarily represented the same number of people. 387 U.S. at 115-17. Of course, crucial to the Abate scheme is the fact that the legislators, although also elected at large,
represent varying numbers of people.
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in part on the illusory need (in this case) for "considerable flexibility"
in "viable local" governments. The danger is that, given the total
lack of evidence presented by the A bate defendants of any flexible,
innovative, or experimental aspect of Plan B, future courts may construe A bate to mean that all local governments should receive greater
deference in apportionment matters. Such an interpretation, and the
per se rule it hints at, seems very plausible when one att!:!mpts to reconcile the Court's language, supposedly stressing innovation and experimentation, with its ultimate decision, which was based essentially
on the historic traditions of Rockland County.
Given the opportunity to clarify the suggestion in Sailors and
Dusch that innovative or experimental approaches to solving the
problem of local government would permit greater deviations from
the equal-population norm, the Supreme Court in Abate merely generated more confusion. Consequently, it remains for lower courts to
develop a coherent approach to deciding in what circumstances flexible, innovative, or experimental governmental schemes can overcome the presumption that fair and effective representation is best
achieved by legislative districts of equal population. Hopefully, these
courts will show greater insight into the complexities of local and
regional government than the Supreme Court did in its superficial
evaluation of Abate.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Abate appeal came before the Supreme Court at an important point in the "reapportionment revolution," the goal of which
has always been the achievement of fair and effective representation.
By 1970, many legal scholars questioned, if not openly opposed,
the Court's approach to the problems of malapportionment. 158 In any
event the time had come for the Court to consider the practical effect of its oftentimes simplistic reapportionment standards. However,
the opportunity presented by Abate was ill used by the Court, which
seemed more interested in finding further easy answers to the complex questions raised by reapportionment controversies. Although the
Court may have recognized the importance of a stable government, it
approved a legislative scheme without regard for either its permanence or quality. The inherent mediocrity of multimember districts
was brushed aside in a footnote, without any consideration of how
much their very existence detracts from the ultimate goal. The Court,
wary of "political thickets," unwisely stumbled into one. The poor
results in Rockland County159 serve to reinforce the argument that
158. See authorities cited in note 90 supra.
159. The sought-after goal of fair and effective representation has not been achieved
in Rockland County during two years under the Plan B legislature. In his 1972 "state
of the county" message, the chairman of the Rockland· County Legislature, Herschel
Greenbaum, stated that the governing body's "own reapportionment should be [its]
chief concern" during the coming year. Greenbaum's message also requested that a new
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such political questions are to be avoided. In the process of venturing
into new areas of judicial evaluation, the Court unnecessarily, and
quite ill-advisedly, jettisoned the previously important good-faith
aspect of the "as nearly as is practicable" standard. The Justices, in
reacting to criticism of their simplistic standards, merely developed
additional absolute rules that ignore the complexities of particular
cases. Flexibility in local governmental forms was properly praised
but improvidently rewarded-without the slightest showing of its
existence in Rockland County. Metropolitan innovations were encouraged, yet parochial traditions were upheld.
A bate did not improve the value of reapportionment as a vehicle
for achieving fair and effective representation. The citizens of Rockland County, although perhaps better off than they were before Lodico, were denied by legislative and judicial failures the best chance
of achieving the ultimate goal. Other communities will be similarly
deprived until the Supreme Court integrates all of the factors involved in reapportionment into a doctrine that recognizes the practical effects of theoretical slogans.

legislative map be constructed of single-member districts. In referring to Plan B's strict
correlation between town boundaries and county legislative districts, Greenbaum commented: "Town lines are not sacred and they should not be regarded as such in considering county issues. The shortcomings of using these boundaries have been amply
demonstrated." The Journal News, Jan. 5, 1972, at 1, col. 5.

